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SHOULD AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PUBLIC CONTRACTS 
CONSTITUTE GOVERNMENT BENEFITS? 
CALCULATING PROCUREMENT FRAUD LOSS UNDER 
SECTION 2B1.1(B)(1) 
Adam Kwon* 
Congress has established a program (the section 8(a) program) that, despite 
having taken various forms over the years, has worked to benefit disadvantaged 
business entities and, by extension, the socioeconomically disadvantaged 
individuals who run them by setting aside and awarding to those entities 
opportunities to perform on certain designated public contracts.  Occasionally, 
people either lie ex ante or fail to fulfill obligations ex post in order to fraudulently 
procure these section 8(a) contracts (i.e., they commit procurement fraud). 
This fairly esoteric area of the law is disoriented by a circuit split over how to 
sentence such white-collar defendants (if convicted) in cases of affirmative action 
procurement fraud.  Specifically, the circuit courts do not agree on how to calculate 
the amount of loss attributed to the fraud, the value of which may result in severe 
sentencing enhancements.  At this point, the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits have all chimed in, yet the issue on which they cannot seem 
to agree is whether a government contract, set aside for affirmative action purposes 
and awarded to a disadvantaged business entity, constitutes a “government benefit” 
for purposes of loss calculation. 
This Essay posits that a section 8(a) public contract does constitute a 
government benefit when calculating loss and, in such cases, that the credits-
against-loss rule should apply as well.  Nominally, the circuits are split only on the 
first issue; however, that nomenclature is part of the reason this split persists.  In 
actuality, the circuit-splitting issue comprises not one but two questions.  Resolution 
will require searching for the answers with binoculars, not a telescope.  This Essay 
attempts to assist in that search by revisiting the events that led to this split in the 
first place and weighing the merits of those courts’ decisions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress’s affirmative action program for public contracts is not immune to 
fraud.  The section 8(a) program, like many similar programs before it, is designed 
to uplift disadvantaged business entities (DBEs) that are owned and controlled by 
 
 *  Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Science, University of Southern 
California, 2012.  Sincere thanks to Professor John Copeland Nagle (requiescat in pace) for his 
thoughtful, reliable advice on and off the page, and to the Notre Dame Law Review Reflection 
editors for their diligent efforts to improve this Essay. 
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socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals.1  In order to accomplish its goal, the 
program grants the Small Business Administration (SBA) the power to ensure that 
certain federal procurement contracts are awarded to 8(a)-qualifying entities. 2  
Sometimes, however, individuals misrepresent that their small businesses qualify 
for section 8(a) government contracts, even though they do not.3  When such a 
procurement fraud occurs, a perpetrator’s criminal sentence is based on the 
calculated loss caused by the fraud—the greater the loss, the harsher the sentence.4 
The federal circuits do not agree on how to calculate loss in cases of section 
8(a) procurement fraud, but the choice to apply one rule over the other has practical, 
potentially drastic sentencing consequences.5  Broadly speaking, the “general rule” 
has been interpreted to allow for the mitigation of calculated loss by applying the 
fair market value of services performed as credit against the loss.6  In contrast, the 
“special rule” (a.k.a. the “government benefits rule”) has been interpreted to 
preclude such a credit, regardless of any performance on the relevant contract.7  The 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits apply the general rule for loss calculation,8 and the Fourth, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits apply the government benefits rule.9  The Third 
Circuit has applied both rules in separate instances, but most recently, it concluded 
that it does not matter whether the general rule or special rule is applied because, in 
its view, both rules provide for the application of credits against the loss to mitigate 
the calculated loss amount (in other words, the calculated loss is the same either 
way).10 
This Essay opines that the current circuit split cannot be resolved by simply 
adopting one side’s opinion because both sides are partly right and partly wrong.  
Moreover, this Essay suggests that the split is nothing more than the understandable 
culmination of consecutive, compounding failures to recognize that the circuit-
splitting issue comprises not one but two relevant questions with common sense 
answers: (1) the government benefits rule (not the general rule) for calculating loss 
 
 1   See 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (2012). 
 2  Id.; id. § 644(g)(2). 
 3  See, e.g., Sarah Westwood, Feds Gave $400 Million in Contracts to Ineligible Firms, 
WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 28, 2014), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/feds-gave-400-
million-in-contracts-to-ineligible-firms. 
 4 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 5  See Law Office of Sara Kropf PLLC, Fifth Circuit Slaps Down District Court’s Loss 
Calculation in Contracting Fraud Case, GRAND JURY TARGET (June 26, 2016), 
https://grandjurytarget.com/2016/06/26/fifth-circuit-slaps-down-district-courts-loss-calculation-
in-contracting-fraud-case/. 
 6  OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRIMER ON LOSS CALCULATIONS 
UNDER § 2B1.1(B)(1) 20–22 (2019), [hereinafter USSC PRIMER]. 
 7 Id. 
 8 United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 
1101 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 9 United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Leahy, 464 
F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bros. Constr. Co. of Ohio, 219 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 10  See United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 183 (3d Cir. 2015); United States v. Tulio, 263 
F. App’x 258 (3d Cir. 2008).  
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should apply in cases of section 8(a) procurement fraud, but (2) the total loss amount 
should still be credited against by the fair market value of services rendered. 
Part I constructs the backdrop against which the issue may be considered; Part 
II introduces the various courts’ opinions that created and extended the circuit split 
at hand; Part III deconstructs the split by chronologically focusing on how the 
confusion among the various circuits arose not in parallel but in series; and 
ultimately, the goal of this Essay is to shed light on a narrow yet impactful area of 
the law by discussing the merits and shortcomings of the relevant courts’ opinions.  
In doing so, the answers to the looming questions ought to be straightforward.  The 
government benefits rule should apply to affirmative action procurement frauds, and 
so should the credits-against-loss rule. 
I.     BACKGROUND: SECTION 8(A) CONTRACTS AND PROCUREMENT FRAUD 
The United States government requires private citizens’ services from time to 
time, and the supply side for such procurements is highly regulated.11  Within the 
folds of this regulation, Congress identified and seized an opportunity to assist both 
small businesses and socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals by passing 
section 8(a) of the Small Business Act.12  Specifically, section 8(a) grants the SBA 
the power to ensure that certain federal procurement contracts—across multiple 
agencies—are awarded to 8(a)-qualifying entities.13  And to qualify under section 
8(a), an entity must, inter alia, be owned and controlled by one or more 
socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals.14  “The 8(a) program, in other words, 
is an affirmative action contracting program.”15 
Under certain circumstances, a section 8(a) contract may be awarded to a joint 
venture comprised of an 8(a)-qualifying entity and a second entity that would not 
qualify on its own.16  When this occurs, the section 8(a) program imposes various 
requirements on the joint venture to ensure that the 8(a)-qualifying member of the 
joint venture realizes a sufficient portion of the total opportunity for itself.17  Such 
requirements ensure that the 8(a)-qualifying entity is not simply a shell company to 
misdirect the section 8(a) opportunities to nonqualifying entities by way of fictional 
joint ventures.18 
Unfortunately, some joint ventures are nothing more than an 8(a)-qualifying 
shell entity cobbled together with a nonqualifying entity for the purposes of 
fraudulently receiving a public contract that has been set aside for a minority-owned 
 
 11  See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulations System, 48 C.F.R. § 1.101 (2018). 
 12  Pub. L. No. 85-536, § 8(a), 72 Stat. 384, 389–90 (1958) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 637 (2012)). 
 13  See Harris, 821 F.3d at 591. 
 14 Id. 
 15  Id. 
 16 8(a) Business Development/Small Disadvantaged Business Status Determinations, 13 
C.F.R. § 124.513 (2019). 
 17  Id. 
 18  See Harris, 821 F.3d at 592. 
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small business.19  Other times, joint ventures simply fail to comply with section 8(a) 
requirements, thereby failing to honor the representations made to the SBA in 
acquiring the contract in the first place.20  In any event, either a misrepresentation to 
the SBA or a subsequent, deliberate failure to comply with the section 8(a) 
requirements can result in a conviction for procurement fraud.21 
At the sentencing stage, certain sentence enhancements may come into play 
depending on the amount of loss sustained as a result of the fraud.22  In general, the 
greater the loss sustained as a result of the fraud, the greater the punishment.23  For 
example, a loss of $6500 or less results in no increase in the level of offense, but a 
loss of $550,000 or more results in a fourteen-level increase, and a loss of 
$550,000,000 or more results in a thirty-level increase.24  Thus, practically speaking, 
the circuit split discussed herein looms with the potential for wildly inconsistent 
sentences for equally culpable defendants convicted of fraud in the procurement of 
section 8(a) public contracts.  
II.     HISTORY: GENERAL RULE VS. SPECIAL RULE 
While section 2B1.1(b)(1) sets out escalating offense-level increases 
depending on the amount of loss caused by the defendant’s offense, it does not 
directly explain how the loss should be calculated. 25   Rather, the method for 
calculation is set forth in and governed by application note 3, which has several 
parts, three of which are relevant for the purposes of this Essay.26 
First, application note 3(A) provides the “general rule” for loss calculation.27  
According to the general rule, loss is defined as “the greater of actual loss or intended 
loss—that is, the greater of the pecuniary harm that foreseeably resulted or that was 
intended to result from the offense.”28  Additionally, within application note 3(A), 
subdivision (v)(II) explains how to apply the general rule to procurement fraud 
cases: 
 
 19  See, e.g., Todd Overman, Business Owner Sentenced to 15 Months for Defrauding SBA’s 
8(a) Program Through Use of “Shell” Company to Receive 8(a) Contracts, BASS, BERRY & SIMS 
PLC (July 8, 2016), https://www.bassberrygovcontrade.com/business-owner-sentenced-to-15-
months-for-defrauding-sbas-8a-program-through-use-of-shell-company-to-receive-8a-contracts/. 
 20  See Joel M. Androphy et al., Government Procurement Fraud and the False Claims Act, 
BERG & ANDROPHY (Oct. 18, 2010), https://www.bafirm.com/publication/government-
procurement-fraud-and-the-false-claims-act/ (“False statements are the most commonly charged 
offense in procurement fraud cases, and are used to penalize common forms of fraudulent 
procurement activity.”). 
 21  18 U.S.C. § 1031 (2012). 
 22  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 23  Id. 
 24  Id. 
 25  See United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 601 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 26  Id. at 601–02; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. nn.3(A), (E), (F) 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018). 
 27  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 28  Harris, 821 F.3d at 602. 
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In the case of a procurement fraud, such as a fraud affecting a defense contract 
award, reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm includes the reasonably 
foreseeable administrative costs to the government and other participants of 
repeating or correcting the procurement action affected, plus any increased costs 
to procure the product or service involved that was reasonably foreseeable.29 
Second, application note 3(E) contains the credits-against-loss rule, which 
states that the amount of loss shall be reduced by, inter alia, 
[t]he money returned, and the fair market value of the property returned and the 
services rendered, by the defendant or other persons acting jointly with the 
defendant, to the victim before the offense was detected.  The time of detection 
of the offense is the earlier of (I) the time the offense was discovered by a victim 
or government agency; or (II) the time the defendant knew or reasonably should 
have known that the offense was detected or about to be detected by a victim or 
government agency.30 
In short, the credits-against-loss rule reduces the amount of calculated loss 
according to the value of any property already returned or any services already 
rendered. 
Lastly, application note 3(F) lists various “special rules.”  Among these, 
application note 3(F)(ii) sets forth a special rule for when “government benefits” are 
involved: 
Notwithstanding subdivision (A), the following special rules shall be used to 
assist in determining loss in the cases indicated: 
. . . . 
     (ii) Government Benefits.—In a case involving government benefits (e.g., 
grants, loans, entitlement program payments), loss shall be considered to be not 
less than the value of the benefits obtained by unintended recipients or diverted 
to unintended uses, as the case may be.  For example, if the defendant was the 
intended recipient of food stamps having a value of $100 but fraudulently 
received food stamps having a value of $150, loss is $50.31 
The disagreement among the circuits lies in the collective interpretation of 
these application notes.  Specifically, when procurement fraud involves a section 
8(a) contract, courts do not agree on whether to apply the general rule, which takes 
into account the credits-against-loss rule, or the special government benefits rule, 
which does not.32 
 
 29  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(v)(II) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2018). 
 30  Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(E)(i). 
 31  Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(F)(ii). 
 32  See supra notes 6–10 and accompanying text. 
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A.   Initial Decisions Applied the Government Benefits Rule 
1.   Brothers Construction (4th Cir. 2000) 
The Fourth Circuit was the first circuit court to consider this question.  In 
United States v. Brothers Construction Company of Ohio, Inc.,33 the district court 
convicted the defendant of procurement fraud in the acquisition and performance of 
public contracts set aside for DBEs.34  Specifically, the district court concluded that 
the total loss amounted to “the exact amount which . . . was diverted away from the 
DBE program.”35  And notably, the defendant never challenged the specific loss 
figure before the district court.36 
On appeal, the defendant argued that its sentence should have been based on 
an actual loss figure, and that the actual loss figure was zero because the contract 
work had been performed.  However, the Fourth Circuit explained that under U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines section 2F1.1, application note 7(d), the loss figure may be 
based on intended loss instead of actual loss.37  And the court noted that the intended 
loss was equal to the value of the entire contract, which would have fraudulently 
benefited a non-DBE but for an audit that caught the fraud.38 
Moreover, the court explained that because the defendant did not challenge the 
loss figure before the district court, the argument had been waived, and the district 
court’s conclusion to apply the government benefits rule was therefore only 
reviewable for plain error.39  Upon consideration, the Brothers Construction court 
explained that an incorrect sentencing based on miscalculation of loss amount could 
be plain error, but in this case, the difference was no more than a harmless error 
because even if, arguendo, the general rule should have applied, it would not have 
actually resulted in the application of a lower sentencing range.  Accordingly, the 
Fourth Circuit—applying the government benefits rule—affirmed.40 
2.   Leahy (7th Cir. 2006) 
Next, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue in United States v. Leahy,41 
where the defendant was similarly convicted of procurement fraud in the acquisition 
and performance of public contracts set aside for DBEs.42  In Leahy, the district court 
determined that the amount of loss was only the amount of profits that the defendant 
 
 33  219 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 34 See id. at 304. 
 35  Id. at 319. 
 36  Id. at 320. 
 37 See id. at 318.  
 38 See id. at 317–18. 
 39  Id. at 320 (“[Defendant’s] ‘failure to object to a sentencing issue amounts to a waiver of 
[its] right to raise that issue on appeal, absent plain error.’” (quoting United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 
1350, 1355 (4th Cir. 1996))). 
 40 Id. at 320–21. 
 41  464 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 42  Id. at 778.  
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had gained from the procurement fraud (i.e., the value of the contract minus the value 
of services rendered).43 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court had improperly 
overcalculated the amount of loss.44  The Seventh Circuit, also relying on section 
2F1.1, application note 7(d), agreed with the defendant that the district court had 
made a mistake, but not because it had applied the general rule incorrectly.45  Rather, 
the court concluded that the government benefits rule should have been applied.46  
The court succinctly explained: “This was an affirmative action program aimed at 
giving exclusive opportunities to certain women and minority businesses.  The 
contracts which these businesses received pursuant to this type of program constitute 
government benefits.”47 
Significantly, the Leahy court did not remand the issue for the district court to 
resentence the defendant based on the government benefits rule because (a) the 
government had not cross-appealed on the issue, and (b) the defendant’s sentence 
had actually been based on another offense that carried a higher offense level than 
the procurement fraud would have carried, even if loss was calculated at the total 
contract value.  In other words, despite holding that the government benefits rule 
should have applied, the Seventh Circuit determined that “a remand would change 
nothing.”48 
3.   Maxwell (11th Cir. 2009) 
Three years after Leahy, the Eleventh Circuit considered the issue in United 
States v. Maxwell.49  Following the footsteps of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, the 
Maxwell court held that the government benefits rule applies to cases involving 
procurement fraud relating to DBE programs.  In so holding, the Eleventh Circuit 
quoted the Seventh Circuit’s language explaining that such affirmative action 
procurement programs fall within the meaning of “government benefits.”  And the 
court further expounded on its rationale: 
[T]he primary purpose of the CSBE and DBE programs is to help small minority-
owned businesses develop and grow, creating new jobs and helping to overcome 
the effects of past discrimination in the construction industry.  Unlike standard 
construction contracts, these contracts focus mainly on who is doing the 
work. . . . Thus, the appropriate amount of loss here should have been the entire 
value of the CSBE and DBE contracts that were diverted to the unintended 
recipient.50 
 
 43 See id. at 789. 
 44 Id.  
 45  See id.  
 46  See id. 
 47  Id. at 790. 
 48  Id.  
 49  579 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 50  Id. at 1306. 
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However, as was the case in Leahy, the government in Maxwell did not cross-
appeal on the issue of loss calculation. 51   Thus, despite its conclusion that the 
government benefits rule applies to contracts that are set aside for affirmative action 
procurement programs, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s sentencing 
order based on a lower loss calculation.52 
B.   Subsequent Decisions Applied the General Rule 
1.   Martin (9th Cir. 2015) 
Six years after Maxwell, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue in United States 
v. Martin.53   Despite acknowledging the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuit 
decisions that came before it, the Martin court arrived at a different conclusion—
that the general rule for loss calculation applies in this context—because in its view, 
an affirmative action public-contract program is not a government benefit.54 
The Ninth Circuit offered four reasons for its conclusion.  First, the court 
reasoned that “the Guidelines’ focus on pecuniary harm suggests a more concrete 
meaning.  The examples given—loans, grants, and entitlement program payments—
confirm that this comment deals with unilateral government assistance, such as food 
stamps, not a fee-for-service business deal.”55  Second, the Martin court applied the 
canonical rule of lenity to interpret the Guidelines in favor of the defendant.56  Third, 
the court noted that application note 3(A) contains what it called the “procurement 
fraud rule” (i.e., application note 3(A)(v)(II)), which, in its view, “indicates that 
procurement fraud cases fall under the general rule.”57  And finally, the court opined 
that “[i]t would be unjust to set the loss resulting from [the defendant’s] fraud as the 
entire value of the contracts” because she had indeed fully performed all of the 
contracts. 58   Based on these reasons (which will be discussed further in 
subsection III.B.2), the Ninth Circuit deviated from its sister circuits’ precedents and 
created a circuit split.59 
 
 51 Id. at 1307. 
 52  Id. (“However, because the Government has not cross-appealed on this issue, a remand to 
increase the amount of loss applicable to [the defendant]’s Sentencing Guidelines calculation is 
unwarranted.  Rather, on this procedural posture, we are called upon only to determine whether the 
district court clearly erred in determining that [the defendant]’s loss amount was not zero.”). 
 53  796 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 54  Id. at 1112 (“On remand, the losses resulting from [the defendant]’s fraud should be 
calculated under the general rules of application note 3(A) of § 2B1.1 rather than under any of the 
special rules of application note 3(F) . . . .”). 
 55  Id. at 1109. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. at 1110. 
 58  Id. 
 59  See USSC PRIMER, supra note 6, at 21–22. 
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2.   Harris (5th Cir. 2016) 
The Fifth Circuit was next to address the question in United States v. Harris.60  
Acknowledging the existence of a circuit split, the Fifth Circuit decided to join the 
Ninth Circuit in holding that an affirmative action procurement program is not a 
government benefit within the meaning of application note 3(F)(ii) and that, 
therefore, the general rule applies.61 
Following the Martin court’s footsteps, the Harris court first reasoned that the 
typical treatment of procurement fraud falls under the general rule as explained in 
application note 3(A)(v)(II).62  Next, the court invoked the doctrine of noscitur a 
sociis to conclude that the section 8(a) program does not fall within application note 
3(F)(ii)’s meaning of the categorical term “government benefits.”63  In particular, 
the court explained that the section 8(a) program “does not share the common 
features of grants, loans, and entitlement program payments. . . . [U]nlike the 
enumerated examples, contracts awarded under the 8(a) program do not exist 
primarily to benefit the awardee; rather, such contracts first and foremost serve the 
government’s own procurement needs.”64  The court further noted that although the 
Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits apply the government benefits rule in similar 
situations, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has squarely rejected the government benefits rule in 
this context,” and “[t]he Third Circuit has left undecided whether the government 
benefits rule applies.”65 
Simply put, the Fifth Circuit in Harris extended the circuit split by rejecting 
the approach of the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits and siding with the Ninth 
Circuit.66 
C.   Third Circuit Cases Reflect Indecision 
Meanwhile, as noted briefly by the Harris court67 and as discussed below, the 
Third Circuit had already considered this issue on two separate occasions by the time 
Harris was decided. 
 
 60  821 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 61  Id. at 604 (“Our sister circuits are split on whether the government benefits rule applies to 
procurement frauds involving contracts awarded under affirmative action programs. . . . We are not 
persuaded by the reasoning of the cases applying the government benefits rule to contracts awarded 
under affirmative action programs.”). 
 62  Id. at 602–03. 
 63  Id. at 603 (“While the three listed examples do not exhaust the category of ‘government 
benefits’—the list is preceded by ‘e.g.’—they are certainly illustrative and limit the category to 
things sharing their common features.”). 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. at 604. 
 66  See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 67  Harris, 821 F.3d at 604 n.9 (“The Third Circuit had previously applied the government 
benefits rule in this context in an unpublished case.  In its subsequent Nagle decision, however, the 
Third Circuit characterized Tulio as ‘cursory’ and expressly repudiated it.” (citation omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 182 n.9 (3d Cir. 2015)). 
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1.   Tulio (3d Cir. 2008) 
Before this circuit split formed, the Third Circuit first heard the question in 
United States v. Tulio.68  However, even though Tulio involved a DBE-program 
procurement fraud, that court did not squarely address the issue, presumably because 
no split had yet occurred.  Rather, the Third Circuit simply noted, inter alia, that “the 
[District] Court specifically found that Application Note 3(F) should apply, in light 
of several analogous cases.”69  Without further discussing the matter, the Third 
Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s holdings, including the decision to 
apply the government benefits rule.70 
Additionally, the Third Circuit’s decision in Tulio was issued as a 
nonprecedential opinion.  Thus, while Tulio marks the Third Circuit’s initial decision 
to apply the government benefits rule in this context, it did not preclude the Third 
Circuit from subsequently concluding otherwise.71 
2.   Nagle (3d Cir. 2015) 
Several years after Tulio, and after this circuit split formed, the Third Circuit 
considered the issue again in United States v. Nagle.72  Ultimately, the Nagle court 
did not decide whether the government benefits rule must apply, but it did discuss 
the issue at length. 
The Third Circuit concluded that if the general rule (application note 3(A)) 
applied, the appropriate loss calculation would have been the value of the contracts 
received minus the value of the performance on the contracts.73  However, the court 
also concluded that if the special rule (application note 3(F)(ii)) applied instead, the 
appropriate loss calculation would not be any different because the credits-against-
loss rule (application note 3(E)(i)) applies regardless of whether the general rule or 
specific rule is used.74 
Notably, in Nagle, the government referred to the opinions issued by the 
Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits mentioned above to argue that application 
note 3(E)(i), the credits-against-loss rule, does not apply when application note 
3(F)(ii), the government benefits rule, is invoked.  In response, the Third Circuit 
explained to the contrary: 
 
 68  263 F. App’x 258 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 69  Id. at 263 (first citing United States v. Tupone, 442 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2006); then citing 
United States v. Bros. Constr. Co. of Ohio, 219 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2000); and then citing United 
States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 70  Id. at 263–64. 
 71  See United States v. Nagle, 803 F.3d 167, 182 n.9 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that as a 
nonprecedential opinion, “[Tulio] is, of course, not binding”); see also INTERNAL OPERATING 
PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 5.7 (2015) 
(“The court by tradition does not cite to its not precedential opinions as authority.”). 
 72 See Nagle, 803 F.3d at 179–83. 
 73  Id. at 180–81. 
 74  Id. at 181–83. 
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First, the special rules of Note 3(F) apply “[n]otwithstanding subdivision (A).”  
Thus, Note 3(F) only supplants Note 3(A) when it applies; it does not supplant 
the other subsections of Note 3.  Second, the drafters of Note 3 knew how to 
indicate that no credits would be permitted. . . . Had the Sentencing Commission 
intended to preclude crediting services rendered against loss for Note 3(F)(ii), it 
would have used similar language as it used in Note 3(F)(v). 
     The Government’s primary argument is that other courts to have considered 
the issue of DBE fraud before us have not allowed a credit against the face value 
of the contracts received in calculating the loss.  We do not find those cases 
persuasive on this point.  First, [Leahy and Brothers Construction] were decided 
using the previous Guidelines provision on fraud and deceit, § 2F1.1. . . . [T]he 
old § 2F1.1 had an application note similar to current Note 3(F)(ii) . . . but no 
application note similar to current Note 3(E)(i).  Therefore, neither the Fourth nor 
Seventh Circuits had occasion to consider whether Note 3(E)(i) required that the 
services rendered be credited against the loss.  Second . . . [the Eleventh Circuit 
in Maxwell] merely relied on Leahy and Brothers Construction and did not 
consider whether Note 3(E)(i) made a difference in the analysis.  Accordingly, 
we see nothing in these cases that convinces us that Notes 3(E)(i) and (F)(ii) do 
not work together to allow a credit for the fair market value of the services 
rendered against the face value of the contracts.75 
Nonetheless, while the Third Circuit opined that the government benefits rule 
should apply (and that the credits-against-loss rule should also apply),76 the court’s 
holding only concluded that regardless of whether a court applies application note 
3(A) or the combination of application notes 3(F) and 3(E), the loss should be the 
total value of the contracts minus the fair market value of the services rendered.77 
Interestingly, Nagle was not an entirely unanimous decision.  Judge Hardiman 
alone concurred in part and concurred in the judgment, relying on the same 
arguments that the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits had previously deemed 
persuasive.78  The concurrence stated in relevant part: 
Because the loss amount calculation in a DBE fraud case of this kind is governed 
by Application Note 3(A) to § 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, I would hold 
that the “government benefits” provision does not apply here. 
. . . . A subdivision of [Note 3(A)], Note 3(A)(v)(II), specifically addresses how 
Note 3(A) is to be applied in procurement fraud cases.  This suggests that Note 
3(F)(ii), a “special rule” designed for cases involving the fraudulent receipt of 
 
 75  Id. at 182–83 (emphases added) (footnotes and internal citations omitted). 
 76  Id. at 181 (“We find the Government’s position persuasive, particularly in light of the 
goals of the DBE program.  The DBE program cares about who performs the work.  It assumes that 
performance of a contract allows a DBE to not only earn a profit on the deal but also to form 
connections with suppliers, labor, and others in the industry.  The profit earned, therefore, is not 
the only benefit the DBE obtains when it receives the contract.”). 
 77  Id. at 183 (“We conclude that in a DBE fraud case, regardless of which application note is 
used, the District Court should calculate the amount of loss under § 2B1.1 by taking the face value 
of the contracts and subtracting the fair market value of the services rendered under those 
contracts.”). 
 78  See id. at 183–84 (Hardiman, J., concurring). 
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public benefits like welfare payments, has no place in a procurement fraud case.  
I would therefore vacate and remand for the District Court to apply Note 3(A).79 
In other words, the concurrence argued that a decision should have been made 
holding that the general rule, not the special rule, applies simply because a 
subdivision of application note 3(A) exists to explain how the general rule would 
apply to a case of procurement fraud.80 
C.   Déjà Vu in the D.C. District Court 
In the wake of the aforementioned cases, district courts—especially those 
located within the remaining circuits’ jurisdictions—are faced with murky 
precedents.  This split has the real potential to result in inconsistent sentencing 
rulings from a single court,81 and such inconsistency is unfair to litigants, even more 
so when those litigants are criminal defendants with rightful expectations of fair 
notice and due process.82   
Moreover, the danger of inconsistent rulings has already been realized, at least 
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 83   Without 
belaboring the details, it is sufficient to point out that the D.C. District Court’s orders 
in Singh and Crummy closely mirror the Third Circuit’s opinions in Tulio and Nagle, 
respectively.  Both Singh and Crummy involved loss calculations in the context of 
section 8(a) procurement fraud.84  Both courts expressly considered the Fourth, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits’ approach, as well as the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ 
 
 79  Id. 
 80  See United States v. Harris, 821 F.3d 589, 604 (5th Cir. 2016) (summarizing the minority 
opinion in Nagle, 803 F.3d at 183–84). 
 81  See, e.g., United States v. Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d 25, 29 (D.D.C. 2016) (“The government 
argues that the ‘loss [in this case] is the full value of the contracts obligated in connection with the 
scheme, which the parties have agreed is $8,533,562.86,’ ‘result[ing] in an [eighteen]-level 
adjustment.’  In contrast, the defendant contends that he ‘provided valuable services to the 
government, gaining only $28,768.28 [in profit] from the relevant contracts,’ resulting in only a 
four-level adjustment.” (alterations in original) (emphases added) (citations omitted) (first quoting 
Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 11, Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d 25 (No. 15-173); 
and then quoting Defendant Tarsem Singh’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 8, Singh, 195 
F. Supp. 3d 25 (No. 15-173))). 
 82  See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2012); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 253–54 
(2005) (“This point is critically important.  Congress’ basic goal in passing the Sentencing Act was 
to move the sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity.”); United States v. 
Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969, 979 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]ntracircuit sentencing disparities—whether the result of disparate judicial interpretations of a 
guideline or prosecutors’ disparate district-wide plea-bargaining policies—defeat the fundamental 
purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines: ‘reasonable uniformity in sentencing’ among federal 
districts.”). 
 83  Compare United States v. Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d 25, 27 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that the 
government benefits rule applies), with United States v. Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d 475, 475 (D.D.C. 
2017) (holding that the general rule applies). 
 84  Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 477; Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 27. 
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approach.85  Both courts even explored the Third Circuit’s opinion in Nagle.86  Yet 
two judges, both representing the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, issued completely opposite orders.  
In Singh, the court applied the government benefits rule as it was (erroneously) 
applied by the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits and held that “the amount of 
the loss to the Government under the fraudulently procured contracts [wa]s based on 
the full value of the contracts awarded,” without applying the credits-against-loss 
rule.87  As the court acknowledged in its order, this resulted in an eighteen-level 
sentencing enhancement.88  In contrast, the Crummy court followed the Ninth and 
Fifth Circuits’ (imperfect) guidance by holding that the contracts at issue “(1) d[id] 
not qualify as government benefits for the purposes of loss calculation, and (2) 
[we]re subject to the credits-against-loss provision.”89 
These holdings illuminate the looming issue.  In Singh, the defendant was 
sentenced with an eighteen-level sentencing enhancement in mind.  And for the sake 
of example, an eighteen-level increase from level six to level twenty-four translates 
to anywhere between fifty-one and one hundred twenty-five extra months of 
imprisonment, depending on a defendant’s criminal history. 90   Meanwhile, in 
Crummy, the court concluded that “the total pecuniary loss to the government 
resulting from Crummy’s procurement fraud was zero.  Therefore . . . the applicable 
Guidelines range for the offense at issue in this case . . . [wa]s zero to six months.”91  
This massive discrepancy is precisely why the circuit split must be resolved. 
III.     DISCUSSION: THE SPECIAL RULE SHOULD APPLY, BUT SO SHOULD THE 
CREDITS-AGAINST-LOSS RULE 
A.   Simplifying the Split 
As an initial matter, this Essay contends that neither side of the current circuit 
split is wholly correct, and the fog which clouds the circuit courts’ reasoning can be 
easily dissipated by an elementary yet significant reframing of the issue(s).  The 
relevant question actually turns on not one but two issues: (1) whether government 
 
 85  Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 487 (“The undersigned is persuaded that Section 8(a) program 
contracts are not properly considered ‘government benefits’ for the purpose of the loss 
calculation . . . although this Court acknowledges that the circuits are currently divided on this 
question.”); Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 29–32 (“This Circuit has not considered whether the Special 
Rule pertaining to government benefits applies to set-aside procurement programs administered by 
the SBA, but decisions from three circuits support this conclusion. . . . The Court respectfully 
disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Martin. . . . Harris is . . . just as unpersuasive as the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Martin.”). 
 86  Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 483; Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 32–33. 
 87  Singh, 195 F. Supp. 3d at 35. 
 88  Id. at 29. 
 89  Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 487. 
 90  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 
2018). 
 91  Crummy, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 488. 
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contracts that are set aside for the section 8(a) program constitute government 
benefits, and (2) whether the application of the government benefits rule precludes 
crediting the fair market value of services rendered against the total loss. 
Viewed in this light, the circuit split itself may be more particularly described.  
Courts on one side (the Ninth and Fifth Circuits) hold that (1) the general rule applies 
because contracts set aside for the section 8(a) program are not government benefits, 
and (2) consequently, they do not need to reach the second issue.92  Courts on the 
other side (the Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits) hold that (1) the special rule 
applies because contracts set aside for the section 8(a) program are government 
benefits, and (2) consequently, the total loss calculation cannot be reduced by the 
fair market value of services rendered.93 
B.   Revisiting the Timeline 
Upon such separation of the issues, a chronological look at the aforementioned 
cases reveals a fairly straightforward yet troubling narrative.  Specifically, this Essay 
questions whether the split was not simply the unfortunate consequence of a series 
of events entirely shrouded in misapprehension and comprising an Eleventh Circuit 
oversight, a policy-driven Ninth Circuit error, a glimmer of Third Circuit clarity, 
and, most recently, a step backwards by the Fifth Circuit. 
1.   Maxwell’s Flawed Assumption 
In Maxwell, the Eleventh Circuit assumed that the government benefits rule 
precludes application of the credits-against-loss rule—i.e., that application note 
3(E)(i) does not apply when 3(F)(ii) is invoked.94   Granted, the Maxwell court 
affirmed a lower loss calculation based on an application of the general rule, despite 
this assumption.95  But as a base proposition, and as the Third Circuit keenly noted 
in Nagle, the assumption itself was incorrect.96 
The Eleventh Circuit’s mistake is understandable in some respects.  After all, 
it was partially caused by the fact that the Fourth and Seventh Circuits both 
employed careless language in Brothers Construction and Leahy, respectively.  In 
particular, both of those cases only involved answering the question of whether the 
general rule or the special rule applies to DBE procurement fraud cases.  The often 
overlooked fact, present in both cases, was that procedural circumstances precluded 
the practicality of questioning whether the value of any services rendered should 
have been credited against the total loss amount.  Neither court needed to consider 
 
 92  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 93  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 94 United States v. Maxwell, 579 F.3d 1282, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Thus, the appropriate 
amount of loss here should have been the entire value of the CSBE and DBE contracts that were 
diverted to the unintended recipient.”). 
 95  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 96  See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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the question because neither court’s conclusion to apply the special rule had any 
further implications on the defendants’ sentences.97 
In fact, the situation facing the Eleventh Circuit in Maxwell had been already 
been played out in Leahy.  Following in the Seventh Circuit’s footsteps, the Eleventh 
Circuit, while concluding that the special rule applied, declined to vacate or reverse 
the district court’s sentence, which was based on an application of the general rule, 
because of procedural circumstances.98  Arguably, the Eleventh Circuit can hardly 
be faulted for mimicking the otherwise sound reasoning of the Seventh Circuit and—
by the transitive property—the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit. 
However, the Eleventh Circuit is not as guiltless as the Seventh or Fourth 
Circuits.  As the Nagle court pointed out, Brothers Construction and Leahy were 
both decided under an older version of the Sentencing Guidelines that contained a 
government benefits provision like application note 3(F)(ii), but did not contain a 
credits-against-loss provision like application note 3(E)(i).99  The Eleventh Circuit 
had an opportunity to specifically consider the credits-against-loss provision 
whereas the Fourth and Seventh Circuits did not.  But the court failed to recognize 
its opportunity.  Thus, at least arguably, the Eleventh Circuit is the most culpable of 
the initial three circuits for propagating the erroneous assumption that the 
government benefits rule precludes application of the credits-against-loss rule. 
2.   Martin’s Flawed Response to Maxwell’s Flawed Assumption 
Perhaps the Ninth Circuit would have, if faced with a procedurally similar case 
as Leahy or Maxwell, accepted the Eleventh Circuit’s mistake as good law.  Instead, 
however, the Ninth Circuit was presented with Martin, wherein the defendant had 
fully performed on all of her public contracts but had nonetheless been sentenced 
under a loss calculation according to the unmitigated, total value of the contracts.  
The Ninth Circuit simply could not ignore the obvious injustice in such an 
outcome.100  Indeed, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded Martin’s sentence to 
be recalculated (essentially according to the credits-against-loss rule)101 because it 
was the just thing to do. 
However, in so holding, the Ninth Circuit seems to have made a mistake of its 
own.  The Martin court took for granted the procedural posture of its sister courts’ 
precedents and made the correlative mistake to those cases’ erroneous assumption.  
The Ninth Circuit should have identified that application note 3(F)(ii) does not 
actually, in any way, preclude the effect of application note 3(E)(i).  But instead, the 
court somewhat carelessly proceeded under the incorrect assumption that it does.102  
 
 97  See supra notes 39, 48 and accompanying text. 
 98  See Maxwell, 579 F.3d at 1307. 
 99  See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 100  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 101  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 102  United States v. Martin, 796 F.3d 1101, 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (“We have also said that 
‘district courts should give credit for any legitimate services rendered to the victims.’ United States 
v. Blitz, 151 F.3d 1002, 1012 (9th Cir. 1998).  Applying the general rule in this and similar cases 
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In other words, the Ninth Circuit failed to parse out the question into the two issues 
it really involves, and it assumed without discussion that only the general rule allows 
for credits against loss. 
Consequently, rather than concluding that application note 3(E)(i) applies even 
when the government benefits rule is invoked, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
government benefits rule does not apply at all to government-administered, 
affirmative action procurement programs.103  In this way, the Ninth Circuit clawed 
back against what it may have viewed as a draconian rule, thereby ensuring that 
procurement fraud losses would always reflect credits for services rendered.  
Notwithstanding the means by which the court achieved it, the final outcome seems 
to have been at least morally correct if one accepts that the credits-against-loss rule 
should always apply to procurement fraud loss calculations.104 
The trouble is, for the reasons discussed by the Fourth, Seventh, Eleventh, and 
Third Circuits, the section 8(a) program plainly provides a government benefit.105  
But in hindsight, between the Ninth Circuit’s failure to recognize the flaw in its sister 
courts’ rulings106 and its blatant goal of remanding for a fairer calculation of loss,107 
the Martin court’s holding is not very surprising.108   Still, the argument that a 
government benefit under application note 3(F) must exclusively involve “unilateral 
government assistance” is only colorable at best, especially considering the plain 
language and organization of the application notes in question.109 
3.    Nagle Offered Clarity  
The Third Circuit heard United States v. Nagle after the Ninth Circuit created 
the circuit split and before the Fifth Circuit widened it.  Notwithstanding the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Harris,110 the Third Circuit was primed to consider the merits 
of the circuit split in its entirety, thereby facing a rare opportunity to help clarify 
murky waters.  All things considered, the Nagle court’s reasoning is commendable 
 
lets district courts do just that.  Applying the special rules, which apply notwithstanding application 
note 3(A), would not.”). 
 103  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 104  See supra notes 30, 58 and accompanying text. 
 105  See, e.g., United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 790 (7th Cir. 2006) (“This was an 
affirmative action program aimed at giving exclusive opportunities to certain women and minority 
businesses.  The contracts which these businesses received pursuant to this type of program 
constitute government benefits.”). 
 106  See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 107  See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 108  See generally Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 315 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“The familiar aphorism that hard cases make bad law should extend to easy cases as well.”). 
 109  See generally Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. 
Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 288 (2010) (“We find this use of noscitur a sociis unpersuasive.  A list of 
three items, each quite distinct from the other no matter how construed, is too short to be particularly 
illuminating. . . . The substantive connection, or fit, between the terms . . . is not so tight or so self-
evident as to demand that we ‘rob’ any one of them ‘of its independent and ordinary 
significance.’”). 
 110  See supra note 62–66 and accompanying text. 
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as sound.  Rather than carelessly following another court’s opinion, the Third Circuit 
performed its own analysis and avoided the logical fallacies that dotted the relevant 
opinions that came before Nagle. 
First, the court identified and rejected the point on which the Martin court was 
most vulnerable; it concluded in dicta that a public contract, set aside for a DBE, is 
a government benefit within the meaning of application note 3(F)(ii).  Thus, at least 
partially, the Third Circuit determined that the government benefits rule should 
apply to cases of affirmative action procurement fraud.111  The court also addressed 
and rejected the Maxwell court’s mistake; it concluded that the credits-against-loss 
provision of application note 3(E)(i) should apply even if the government benefits 
rule is applied.112  On these bases alone, this Essay contends that the Third Circuit in 
Nagle became the first circuit to correctly analyze the issues presented, at least on 
an individual level. 
However, the holding of Nagle is uniquely unhelpful to weighing the circuit-
splitting question as conceived of by its sister circuits.  Rather than choosing a side, 
the court held that either the general rule or special rule could be applied because in 
either instance, the net loss (total value of contracts minus credits against loss) would 
be the same figure.113 
While this may have been true in Nagle, it may not be true in all section 8(a) 
procurement fraud cases moving forward.  Thus, this Essay laments that the Nagle 
court fell just short of providing a fully satisfactory opinion.  Specifically, the Third 
Circuit should have affirmatively held that the government benefits rule applies to 
DBE-program public contracts.  As it stands, however, the Third Circuit’s holding 
only answered the second of the two issues as presented in Section III.A—the 
credits-against-loss rule applies.  In this way, the Third Circuit sided with the Ninth 
Circuit on the issue of credits against loss, but it artfully avoided the logical fallacy 
that weakened the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Martin by also rejecting the idea that 
the general rule must apply in this context. 
4.   Harris Rejected Nagle’s Offer  
Arguably, the Third Circuit’s opinion in Nagle should have provided enough 
clarity and guidance on the issue such that another circuit considering the question 
for the first time could have been able to avoid the traps of the past.  In an ideal 
world, the next circuit to address the issue would have similarly recognized that the 
government benefits rule applies in cases of section 8(a) procurement fraud, but that 
the credits-against-loss rule also applies. 
However, when such an opportunity presented itself to the Fifth Circuit in 
Harris, the court more or less echoed the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Martin, and, 
consequently, it made the same mistakes.114  If Nagle marks a step forward towards 
 
 111  See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 112  See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 113  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 114  See supra notes 60–66 and accompanying text. 
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clarity and resolution, Harris marks an equal step back.  Despite the Third Circuit’s 
enlightening opinion in Nagle, the circuit split staunchly persists. 115   And as 
illustrated in Section II.C, litigants are forced to accept that their sentence 
enhancements may be decided, for better or worse, by a judicial coin toss.116 
CONCLUSION 
The circuit-splitting question—whether the general rule or special rule applies 
to loss calculations in cases of affirmative action procurement fraud—is riddled with 
misunderstanding.  But the key to resolving this circuit split lies in reframing the 
issue(s) as described in Section III.A.  Viewed in that light, one may more clearly 
see how the current split developed and, better yet, how it ought to be resolved. 
The Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits (a) held that the government 
benefits rule for loss calculation applies in the DBE procurement fraud context, and 
(b) erroneously assumed that the government benefits rule precluded any credits 
against the loss amount.  Faced with a different set of circumstances, the Ninth 
Circuit (a) determined that the credits-against-loss rule always applies in 
procurement fraud cases, and (b) held, based on an equal and opposite erroneous 
assumption, that the general rule for loss calculation must apply to all procurement 
fraud cases (i.e., that a public contract is not a government benefit).  The Third 
Circuit, despite failing to decisively choose a side on the first issue, explained with 
great clarity that (a) the government benefits rule should apply to DBE procurement 
fraud loss calculations, and (b) even when the government benefits rule is invoked, 
the credits-against-loss rule should still apply. 
Finally, despite the obvious necessity for resolution, this circuit split is highly 
unlikely to resolve itself.  The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Harris all but ensures that 
the circuits will remain entrenched in misguided disagreement unless and until a 
higher authority sets forth a binding precedent upon the land.  In the meantime, one 
can only hope that the next circuit to consider the issue will stumble upon and follow 
the Third Circuit’s lead in Nagle.  With any luck, the next circuit to decide the issue 
will go one step further and hold not only that the credits-against-loss rule applies in 
all cases of procurement fraud, but also that the government benefits rule, not the 
general rule, applies to the calculation of losses caused by the fraudulent 
procurement of affirmative action public contracts. 
 
 115  See, e.g., USSC PRIMER, supra note 6, at 21 (“Courts have disagreed about whether to 
apply this special rule where defendants have improperly received benefits pursuant to a set-aside 
or similar program.”). 
 116  See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
